Hastings Law Journal
Volume 34 | Issue 5

Article 1

5-1983

Implying Rights of Action for Minorities and the
Poor through Presumptions of Legislative Intent
Stephen E. Ronfeldt

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stephen E. Ronfeldt, Implying Rights of Action for Minorities and the Poor through Presumptions of Legislative Intent, 34 Hastings L.J.
969 (1983).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol34/iss5/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Implying Rights of Action For
Minorities and the Poor Through
Presumptions of Legislative
Intent
By STEPHEN E. RONFELDT*

As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts may not exercise
judicial powers in the absence of either an express or implied cause of
action. t In cases in which Congress did not provide an express cause
* Senior Lecturer on Law & Poverty, King Hall School of Law, University of California at Davis (1981-82); Senior Attorney, Legal Aid Society of Alameda County, California. B.A., 1964, Whitman College; J.D., 1967, Boalt Hall, University of California at
Berkeley. This Article was made possible through a fellowship grant from the Research
Institute of the Legal Services Corporation. The views expressed herein do not necessarily
reflect those of the Legal Services Corporation.
1. Congress has enacted two statutes that the courts have interpreted to provide express causes of action in most types of cases against federal and state defendants. Section
702 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides a right of judicial review to persons aggrieved by agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976) ("A person suffering a legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."). The federal courts have interpreted this section to provide a cause of action in suits against federal administrative agencies. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). This
right, however, does not apply when "(1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1976). The burden is on
the defendant to establish that these exceptions apply, and, generally speaking, the courts
have not applied these exceptions in the absence of a clear legislative intent to preclude
judicial review. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1967).
Similar presumptions apply in suits brought under § 1983 of the Reconstruction Civil
Rights Act. In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980), the Supreme Court held that 42
U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for state deprivations of rights secured by any
federal law, not just rights secured under the Constitution or civil rights laws. Under this
interpretation, plaintiffs can sue state and local officials when they violate rights secured by a
federal statute, whether or not the statute itself provides a private right of action. The Court
did not expressly draw this implication, but it follows both from the broad holding that any
federal statute may support a § 1983 action and from the Court's own recognition that it was
allowing a § 1983 action under a statute (the Social Security Act) that provided no private
right of action. See id at 6; see also id at 22 n. II (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for exposing potentially any state agency regulated by federal law to private suits
under § 1983). At a minimum, Thiboutot created a presumption that a federal statute creating federal rights may be enforced in a § 1983 action.
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of action when creating statutory rights, federal courts must imply private rights of action if plaintiffs are to obtain judicial relief for viola2
tions of these rights.
During the Warren Court era, the United States Supreme Court
liberally granted implied rights of action when implication would effectuate the congressional purposes underlying the statutory right at issue. 3 The Burger Court, consistent with its theme of judicial restraint,
reversed that trend. Its decisions allow implication only if there is a
4
legislative intent to create an implied right of action.
If construed strictly, the legislative intent test effectively could
eliminate the implication doctrine. Several Supreme Court Justicesthe "strict constructionists"-advocate that federal courts not imply
rights of action absent the "most compelling evidence that Congress in
fact intended such action to exist." 5 Rarely, if ever, does Congress specifically state such an intent when the statute does not expressly provide
for a cause of action.6 The strict constructionists' position has two un2. Implied right of action issues normally arise in federal, rather than state, courts
because the former are courts of limited jurisdiction and subject to the separation of powers
doctrine under article III of the United States Constitution. This Article only discusses implied rights of action under statutes. Different standards apply for implied rights under the
Constitution. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). The doctrines of implied right of
action and standing to sue are frequently confused. While the former is concerned with
whether plaintiff has a cause of action, the latter presumes that someone has a cause of
action to enforce a particular right and raises the additional "question of whether a plaintiff
is sufficiently adversary to a defendant to create an Art. III case or controversy, or at least to
Id at 239 n.18. See
overcome prudential limitations on federal-court jurisdiction.
Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 498 (1979).
3. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969): J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
4. See. e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979):
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). Numerous commentators have criticized the restrictive legislative intent test. See, e.g., Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67
VA. L. REv. 553 (1981); Pillir,Negative Implication: The Demise of Private Rights ofAction in
the Federal Courts, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1978); Comment, Implied Rights of Action in
FederalLegislation- Harmonization Within the Statutory Scheme, 1980 DUKE L.J. 928; Note.
Implied PrivateAction Under FederalStatutes-The Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine,
18 WNi. & MARY L. REV. 429 (1976). While the author agrees with the basic criticisms of
the Supreme Court's restrictive test presented by these commentators, there appears to be
little chance that the Court will liberalize its test. The future of implied rights of action, if
any, lies in the art of construing the Court's legislative intent test, which is the subject of this
Article.
5. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353. 408-09 (1982)
(Powell, J.. dissenting). The three other Justices who joined Justice Powell in this dissent.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Conner, and who appear to agree consistently with this restrictive approach are referred to as the "strict constructionists." Their
position is discussed in greater detail, infra, text accompanying notes 124-41.
6. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979). The doctrine of im-
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fortunate effects: it closes the courthouse doors to aggrieved persons

seeking judicial relief for violations of rights created by Congress and,
as a consequence, it effectively immunizes private businesses and other
regulated entities from judicial review of their noncompliance with regulatory requirements.
The harshest consequences of the strict constructionists' position
fall upon minorities and the poor. They, more than any other groups,
are dependent upon federal regulatory programs for their basic welfare
and protection of their fundamental rights. 7 Yet, the administration of
many of these programs, particularly under present federal policies to
reduce government funding and regulation in social programs, is ineffective, unresponsive and even contrary to the interests of the intended

beneficiaries. 8 Lacking the political or economic power to remedy systematic abuses of their rights before Congress or the responsible adplied rights of action is a judicial, not a legislative, concept. It would be highly unusual
therefore if Congress stated a specific intent to imply a private right of action when it had
not provided an express cause of action.
7. Examples of such regulatory programs include: programs for civil rights protections, titles VI and IX of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(d)-2000(d)(6) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981) and 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1683 (1976) (prohibiting race and sex discrimination
by entities receiving federal financial assistance); health care for indigents, e.g., Hill-Burton
Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291(h) (1976) (requiring provision of free health care services to
indigents by hospitals receiving federal assistance for construction of facilities); patient care,
e.g., Community Development Block Grant Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981) (requiring cities receiving federal block grant funds to use them for the primary benefit of low and moderate-income persons); fair lending, e.g., Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp. V 1981) (requiring lending institutions to
affirmatively meet the credit needs of all segments of the community); compensatory and
bilingual education, e.g., Bilingual Education Program, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3223 (Supp. V
1981); 4 C.F.R. § 123 (1982) (requiring bilingual education by public schools receiving federal funds); employment, e.g., Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 801-999 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (providing federal funds to local commissions for training
unemployed or underemployed persons); and welfare and food subsistence, e.g., Aid for
Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (providing welfare payments for low-income families with dependent children); Food Stamp Program, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2029 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (providing food stamps to low-income persons).
8. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1980's:
DISMANTLING THE PROCESS OF DISCRIMINATION 4-5 (1981); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS: A NATIONAL, NOT A SPECIAL INTEREST 1 (1981); U.S. COMM'N ON

CIVIL RIGHTS, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: 1954-19?? at 14-15, 28-30 (1981); GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM FOR FEDERAL

NONCONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS CAN BE IMPROVED 1 (1975); Dooley, Legal Services in

the 80s and Challenges Facingthe Poor, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE RE. 704 (1982); Ronfeldt &
Galloway, Beneficiary.Based Enforcement of Federal Regulatory Programs." Strategiesfor
CompellingFederalAgencies andRegulatees to Comply with Public Interest Laws, -- How.
L.J. - (1983); Ronfeldt & Galloway, NullifyingAffirmative Action Through Deregulation, 16
U.C.D. L. REV. 107 (1982); Seng, PrivateRights ofAction, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 1117, 1133
n.69 (1978) ("[A]Ul too often the federal agency enforcement machinery in areas of civil

972
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ministrative agencies, minorities and the poor turn to the courts for
legal protection. By closing the courthouse doors, the strict constructionists would leave these groups without a responsive, peaceful forum
to redress their grievances, and therefore without remedies for violations of rights created by Congress.
This Article proposes a construction of the legislative intent test
that would enable federal courts to imply rights of action for minorities
and the poor that would avoid the harsh consequences of the strict constructionist approach yet remain consistent with both Supreme Court
precedent and congressional intent. The proposed construction involves two presumptions derived from existing case law but not explicitly stated therein. 9 The first, a "presumption of enforceability," is
based on the fact that federal courts have historically favored implication under statutes creating rights for special classes of persons.' 0
Analysis of recent case law applying the legislative intent test shows
that this presumption is still supported by a majority of the Supreme
Court." Thus, when a plaintiff seeks to enforce a statutory right created to protect a special class of which he or she is a member, federal
courts should presume a legislative intent to create a private remedy.
This presumption especially applies to laws protecting rights of minorities and the poor.
The second presumption, a "presumption of exclusivity," arises
rights has proved inefficacious at best."); Comment, PrivateRights ofAction Under Title IX.
13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 425, 466-70 (1978).
9. The actual terminology of presumptions used in this Article has not been used in
any majority decision by the United States Supreme Court. However, Justices Stevens and
Blackmun have recently referred to presumptions in a separate opinion analyzing the
Court's development of the implied right of action law. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 23, 28 (1981) (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun.
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
10. Reviewing federal court history, Justice Stevens explained:
Although criminal laws and legislation enacted for the benefit of the public at large
were expected to be enforced by public officials, a statute enacted for the benefit of
a special class presumptively afforded a remedy for members of that class injured
by violations of the statute . . . .Applying that presumption, our truly conservative federal judges-men like Justice Harlan, Justice Clark, Justice Frankfurter.
and Justice Kirkpatrick-readily concluded that it was appropriate to allow private
parties who had been injured by a violation of a statute enacted for their special
benefit to obtain judicial relief. For rules are meant to be obeyed and those who
violate them should be held responsible for their misdeeds . . . .Since the earliest
days of the common law, it has been the business of the court to fashion remedies
for wrongs.
Id. at 23.
11. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 391 n.91 (1982)
(quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 447 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979)).
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from the enactment of comprehensive judicial or administrative remedies, indicating a legislative intent to exclude other remedies.' 2 Such
legislative schemes give rise to a presumption of exclusivity that normally should override the presumption of enforceability. However,
when the alternative remedies are not comprehensive, as is frequently
the case in regulatory programs for the poor and minorities, 13 this Article argues that the presumption of exclusivity should not override the
presumption of enforceability. 14
When the two presumptions appear to be in conflict or the court is
uncertain whether to imply a right, the court should consider whether
implication would further or frustrate the congressional purpose underlying the statutory right at issue. While the Burger Court has discouraged implying rights primarily to effectuate a congressional purpose,' 5
that purpose may still be determinative in close cases when considera16
tion of other legislative indicators fails to resolve the issue.
Presumption of Enforceability
Case Development
Pre-Burger Court
The early history of implied rights of action was guided by the
ancient maxim ubijus ibi remedium-for every right there is a remedy. 17 English common law restated the rule: "So, in every case, where
a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall
have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for the recompence of a wrong done to him contrary to the
said law."' 18
The United States Supreme Court, in some of its earliest decisions,
adopted the common law principle in dicta. "[I]t is a general and indis12. See supra notes 9, 160-61 & accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 182-89 & accompanying text.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 180-89.
15. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979)
("While some [earlier] opinions of the court have placed considerable emphasis upon the
desirability of implying private rights of action in order to provide remedies thought to
effectuate the purposes of a given statute, . . . what must ultimately be determined is
)
whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted .
16. See infra note 44 & accompanying text.
17. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374 n.52 (1982).
18. 1 Comyns' Digest 433, 442 (1882) (quoted in California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S.
287, 300 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring)). See Couch v. Steele, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1854);
Anonymous, 87 Eng. Rep. 791 (1703) (per Holt, C. J.); see also 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (6th Ed. 1681); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 23, 51, 109,
123 (4th ed. 1899).
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putable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded."' 9 The
notion that Congress could create an undeniable right for which the
courts could not provide an appropriate remedy was considered a
"monstrous absurdity. 2 °
The same principle guided the Supreme Court's decision in Texas
& Pacific Railway v. Rigsby,21 frequently referred to as the first federal
court implied right of action decision. 22 The Court in Rigsby approved
a damages claim by a railway employee injured in a fall from a boxcar
allegedly caused by a defective handhold. While Rigsby involved a tort
claim, the Court's analysis focused on implying a right of action under
a statute designed to protect the plaintiff. The Federal Safety Appliance Acts required that "all cars having ladders shall also be equipped
with secure hand holds ....,,23 The Court held that the "disregard of
the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in
damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted, the right to recover damages from the party in default is implied .... ,,24 Thus, the key factor was the violation of a statutory
directive enacted for the benefit of a special class, railway employees,
of which plaintiff was a member.
Between 1930 and 1944 the Supreme Court implied rights of action in four cases 25 decided under the Railway Labor Act of 1926.26
19. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 23 (4th ed. 1899)).
20. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 522, 623 (1838) ("[T]he power to enforce
the performance of the act must rest somewhere, or it will present a case which has often
been said to involve a monstrous absurdity in a well-organized government, that there
should be no remedy, although a clear and undeniable fight should be shown to exist.").
21. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
22. Rigsbj, is frequently referred to as the original case implying a private cause of
action in federal courts. Justice Powell, however, asserts that Rigsby did not imply a cause
of action, but merely applied a statutory standard in a negligence case, exercising general
federal common law powers then recognized under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I
(1842). Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 732 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting.).
Other commentators refer to Rigsby as an implied cause of action case using a "statutorytort" approach. See, e.g., Note, Implication of PrivateActions from FederalStatutes: From
Borak to Ash, I J. CORP. L. 371, 375-77 (1975-76).
23. Pub. L. No. 133, § 2, 36 Stat. 298 (1910).
24. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 39.
25. Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen. 323 U.S. 210
(1944); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944): Virginian Ry. Co. v.
System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548
(1930).
26. Pub. L. No. 257, § 1,44 Stat. 577 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).

May/July 19831

IMPLYING RIGHTS OF ACTION

This Act established important collective bargaining and other rights
for a special class, railway employees, but provided no administrative
mechanism for their protection. In Steel v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., the Court stated that the collective bargaining "right would
be sacrificed or obliterated if it were without the remedy which courts
can give for breach of such a duty or obligation .... -27 Thus, the
Court derived its power to imply a right of action strictly from a statute
designed to protect a special class, noting that implication was, in effect,
"contemplated" by Congress. 28
In the landmark case ofJZ Case Co. v. Borak,2 9 the Court implied
a right of action on the basis of a statutory policy for the protection of a
class of persons and the need to effectuate that policy. The plaintiff
shareholder brought a civil suit for damages against a corporation for
use of false and misleading proxy statements to obtain shareholder approval of a corporate merger in violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.30 The Court found that the plaintiff was a member
of a class of individuals whom Congress intended to benefit, since the
"protection of investors" was among the chief purposes of the statute.3 1
Noting that the administrative mechanism for the protection of investors was inadequate, the Court reasoned that "under the circumstances
here, it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as
'3 2
are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.
The Supreme Court followed Borak in Allen v. State Board of
Elections,33 permitting a private right of action on behalf of minority
34
plaintiffs to enforce a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
We have previously held that a federal statute passed to protect a
class of citizens, although not specifically authorizing members of the
protected class to institute suit, nevertheless implied a private right of
action ....
A similar analysis is applicable here. The guarantee of
Section 5... might well prove an empty promise unless the private
citizen were allowed to seek judicial enforcement of the
27. 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944).
28. Id
29. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
30.

Pub. L. No. 291, § 14,48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 76 (1976 &

V 1981)).
31. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432 ("While this language [of the Act] makes no
specific reference to a private right of action, among its chief purposes is the 'protection of
investors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to
achieve that result.").
32. Id at 433.
33. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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35

Reviewing additional cases decided before the Burger Court era,
the Supreme Court explained in Cannon v. University of Chicago36 that
the determinative factor in each of the implied right of action cases was
the establishment of a legislative directive for a special class:
Not surprisingly, the right- or duty-creating language of the statute
has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of
implication of a cause of action. With the exception of one case, in
which the relevant statute reflected a special policy against judicial
interference, this Court has never refused to imply a cause of action
where the language of the statute explicitly conferred a right directly
on a class of persons that included the plaintiff in the case ...
Conversely, the Court has been especially reluctant to imply causes
duties on the part of persons for
of actions under statutes that create
37
the benefit of the public at large.
35. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. at 557.
36. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
37. Id. at 690 n. 13. The opinion further listed the following cases, in addition to those
cases already discussed supra at notes 21-35 & accompanying text, granting an implied right
of action when the language created rights for the special class: Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, 396 U.S. 229, 238 (1969) (42 U.S.C. § 1982: "All citizens of the United States shall
have the same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof...."); Jones v. Alfred H.
Meyer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414-15, n.13 (1968) (same); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 191, 200-02 (1967) (33 U.S.C. § 409: "It shall not be lawful [to obstruct
navigable waterways]"); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) (same).
See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 690 n. 13 ("Analogously, the court
has implied causes of action in favor of the United States in cases where the statute creates a
duty in favor of the public at large.").
The opinion also listed the following cases that involved statutes creating duties for the
benefit of the public at large and which therefore did not grant implied rights of action:
Piper v. Cris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) ("unlawful conduct"); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) ("duty of SIPC to 'discharge obligation' "):
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of Ry. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974)
("forbidding 'action, practice, or policy inconsistent' with the Act"); Wheedlin v. Wheeler,
373 U.S. 647 (1963) ("setting procedure for procuring congressional subpoena"); T.I.M.E.,
Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959) ("duty of every common carrier.., to establish
"); Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv.
just and reasonable rates ..
Co., 341 U.S. 246 (195 1) ("similar duty of gas pipeline companies"). See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 690-92 n.13.
Justice Powell came to a different conclusion in his historical review of implied right of
action cases. This review, he asserted, showed an "almost invariable refusal to imply private
actions, absent a complete failure of alternative enforcement mechanisms and a clear expresId.
I..." at 739 (Powell, J., dissenting).
sion of legislative intent to create such a remedy .
This conclusion was reached by strained distinctions of most cases granting implied fights of
action. For example, Rigsby is explained away as a tort decision, Borak as "unprecedented
and incomprehensible," Allen as "reached without substantial analysis," and the four decisions implying rights of action under the Railway Labor Act as due to a peculiar historical
context. Id. at 732-38.
Moreover, Justice Powell created a major exception to his general statement, i e., those
cases involving a complete failure of alternative enforcement mechanisms and a clear ex-
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In sum, the pre-Burger Court cases frequently granted implied
rights of action on the basis of a sole criterion: a statute creating a right

for a special class of which plaintiff was a member. Borak and its progeny added the policy consideration of granting implication when it
would effectuate the underlying congressional purpose. Consideration
of that factor increased the likelihood of implication, because implication would normally effectuate purposes of statutes creating rights for
special classes.
The Burger Court Era
During the last decade there has been a major transition in the law

of implied rights of action. One of the major factors influencing this
transition has been the extensive increase in federal grants and other

regulatory legislation since the 1960's. 38 Concurrently, there has been a
vast growth in the administrative agencies that carry out the regulatory
programs.3 9 Uinder these circumstances, an overly liberal implication
doctrine might have several negative effects: 1) overburdening the judiciary due to an increased potential for litigation, 2) unnecessarily circumventing the administrative processes established to carry out
regulatory programs, 3) imposing damages or other remedies upon
regulatees contrary to regulatory objectives, and 4) intruding upon the
legislature's province of lawmaking. 4°
It therefore was necessary for the Court to reflect upon its proper

role in implying rights of action. But these pragmatic considerations
did not mean that the Court should abandon, or even severely restrict,
pression of legislative intent to create such a remedy. This exception could be interpreted so
broadly as to swallow the rule, particularly because Justice Powell asserted that most every
case denying implication did so due to the presence of alternative administrative mechanisms. Id at 735. Finally, Justice Powell incorrectly inferred that courts would not imply a
right of action except in the complete absence of alternative enforcement mechanisms. 1d
at 739. However, the Court has implied rights of action in several cases involving inadequate administrative mechanisms for the purpose, at least in part, of compensating for that
inadequacy. See infra text accompanying notes 152-55.
38. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377-78 (1982) (the
increased complexity of federal legislation and the increased volume of federal litigation
strongly supported the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent than Rigsb), had required); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1981) (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("In recent years, however, a court that is properly concerned about the burdens
imposed upon the Federal Judiciary, the quality of the work product of the Congress, and
the sheer bulk of new federal legislation, has been more and more reluctant to open the
courthouse door to the injured citizen.").
39. See J, FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 3-6 (1978).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 133-37.
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its implication doctrine. The need for implication-to protect intended
beneficiaries from the violation of their rights by noncomplying regulatees-was as great as ever. What was necessary was the establishment of thoughtful standards to guide future implied rights of action
decisions.
The Court, however, has tended to take a doctrinaire, rather than
a pragmatic, approach to these problems due to a significant change in
its membership and philosophy. The change from the Warren Court to
the Burger Court brought six new Justices and a philosophy of judicial
restraint, 4 1 consistent with current political themes advocating a halt in
the growth of federal grant legislation and in the governmental regulation of private businesses. These Justices have brought to the Court a
"vague judicial hostility to regulatory legislation, a sense that Congress
has illegitimately extended the pervasive intrusion of federal law into
private life. .... -42 The strict constructionist position is one means of
furthering deregulation.
The shift by the Burger Court toward a more restrictive implication doctrine began most significantly in Cort v. Ash 43 In Cort, the
single-factor test of Rigsby-protection of a special class-was combined with three additional inquiries:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not
expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the
plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted,'. . . that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?...
Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? . . .And finally, is
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate
to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? 44
While the Cort test added substantial factors to the implied right
of action test, it was nonetheless consistent with the historic presumption of enforceability. The first factor, questioning whether the statute
at issue creates a right for the benefit of the plaintiff, deals directly with
the presumption. The second factor, concerning a legislative intent to
41.

See, e.g., cases and articles cited supra note 4.

42.

Note, Intent, ClearStatements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretaionin the

Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 911 (1982). "The corollary of this judicial deregulation is a vision of laissez-faire individualism as the embodiment of a 'natural order'--an
order that protects individuals from the pervasiveness, inexplicability, and uncertainty of
regulatory law." Id
43. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
44. Id. at 78.
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create or deny an implied right of action, may support or rebut the
presumption. Significantly, the Court explained that when "it is clear
that federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not
necessary to show [a congressional] purpose to create a private cause of
action, although an explicit [congressional] purpose to deny such cause
of action would be controlling. 4 5
The third factor, examining the consistency of an implied right of
action with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme, was the
primary criterion considered in Borak.46 A determination that implication would further the legislative purpose would support the presumption of enforceability. But the presumption may be rebutted by a
determination that implication would frustrate the legislative purpose. 41 The fourth factor, concerning alternative state remedies, may
also lead a court to reject the presumption when the cause of action is
traditionally relegated to state law.
The Supreme Court, using the Cori analysis, refused to imply
causes of action in its next three implied right of action cases.48 The
courts of appeals, however, found the new standards sufficiently flexible to imply causes of action in approximately twenty cases during the
49
four years after Corr.
The Supreme Court then converted the four-factor Cort analysis
into a legislative intent test in Cannon v. University of Chicago 50° The
four factors were transformed into guideposts for answering the ultimate question, whether Congress intended to provide a private cause of
action: "[B]efore concluding that Congress intended to make a remedy
available to a special class of litigants, the court must carefully analyze
S
the four factors the court identified as indicative of such intent."'
45. Id at 82 (emphasis in the original).
46. See supra notes 29-32 & accompanying text.
47. This criterion becomes important if a determination on the implied right of action
is not clear from an examination of the statute or its legislative history. A statute, for example, may provide an alternative administrative remedy, but it may not be clear from the face
of the statute or from the legislative history whether that remedy was intended to be exclusive or whether it is a realistic or adequate alternative. The court, facing such a situation,
would then have to look at the statutory purposes underlying the legislative scheme and to
the actual administrative mechanism to determine if implying a right of action would be
consistent with Congress' objectives. For discussion of this criterion in greater detail, see
infra text accompanying notes 172-88.
48. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49 (1978); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
49. These cases are listed in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 741-42
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
50. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
51. Id at 688.
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While the Cort test left open the opportunity for the courts to imply a
cause of action to further the purposes of the statute, the Court in Cannon allowed a cause of action to be implied only if the legislature intended to provide such an action.
Despite this narrowing of the implication doctrine, the Supreme
Court found an implied right of action in Cannon for a plaintiff alleging sex discrimination in violation of title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.52 Moreover, the intent test was applied in a manner
consistent with the historic presumption of enforceability. The Court,
in its effort to divine legislative intent, looked first at the right- or dutycreating language of the statute for a special class. That language was
considered "the most accurate indicator" of legislative intent, and thus
of the propriety of implying the cause of action. 53 The first step was
therefore equivalent to a determination of the presumption.
Next the Court looked at the legislative history and found an affirmative intent that a cause of action be implied. Title IX was patterned after title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196454 that had
previously been interpreted to imply a cause of action. 55 Because Congress, in enacting title IX, could have assumed that similar statutes
would have an implied cause of action, the Court reasoned that Con56
gress acquiesced in that assumption.
Significantly, the Court followed the same approach regarding legislative history as in Cori. Because the legislative history of a statute
without an express right of action will typically be silent or ambiguous
on an intent to imply, it is not necessary to show an intent to create a
private right of action when a statute creates a federal right for a special class.5 7 Thus, the Court in Cannon, having found in the legislative
history no affirmative intent to imply, nonetheless concluded that an
implied right of action was appropriate because the right- or duty-creating language in the statute is the "most accurate indicator" of
intent. 58
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 690 n.13.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 694-96.
Id. at 699.

57. Id.at 694.
58. The Court also decided that implying a cause of action would further, rather than
frustrate, the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme. The available administrative
remedy-termination of federal funds-may be appropriate to prevent the use of federal
funds to support discriminatory practices, but is not appropriate as a remedy in a case in
which an individual citizen needs reinstatement or other protection against discriminatory
practices. "The award of individual relief to a private litigant who has prosecuted her own
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The Cannon decision had a strange and shaky 6-3 majority. Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion, was joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist
and Stewart, who are among the most ardent advocates of a restrictive
approach, concurred. Justice Rehnquist explained that prior decisions
such as Borak "gave Congress good reason to think that the federal
judiciary would undertake" the task of determining whether there
should be a private right of action.5 9 However, he further stated that
Congress should, in the future, specify when it intends private litigants
to have a cause of action and that the Court "should be extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity on the part of
'60
the Legislative Branch.1
Within six months after Cannon, Justices Rehnquist and Stewart
respectively wrote the majority opinions in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington6 t and TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis. 62 While
these two cases further restricted the legislative intent test, they did not
overrule Borak and were not inconsistent with the presumption of
enforceability.
In Touche Ross, the plaintiffs, customers of securities brokerage
firms, sought an implied right of action for damages under section
17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193463 against accountants for
alleged misstatements and falsifications in financial reports prepared
for the brokerage firms. Section 17(a) only required that brokers keep
certain records and file certain reports as required by the SEC.64 The
Court, in an 8-1 decision, held that "[section] 17(a) neither confers
65
rights on private parties nor proscribes any conduct as unlawful."
The case was therefore distinguishable from such cases as Cannon,
Borak and Allen in which the Court implied private rights of action
under statutes creating federal rights on behalf of a special class. In66
deed, the Court explicitly noted the distinction.
suit is not only sensible but is also fully consistent with-and in some cases even necessary
to-the orderly enforcement of the statute." Id at 705-06.
59. Id at 718 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring).
60. Id
61. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
62. 444 U.S. 511 (1979).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 789(a) (1976).
64. id
65. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 569.
66. "It is true that in the past our cases have held that in certain circumstances a private
right of action may be implied in a statute not expressly providing one. But in those cases
finding such implied private remedies, the statute in question at least prohibited certain
conduct or created federal rights in favor of private parties." Id
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The Court in Touche Ross did, however, take a further step in refining the legislative intent test. It limited the significance of the fourfactor Cort test by noting that the factors were not of equal weight and
that the most important elements were the statutory language, history
and purpose:
It is true that in Cori v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that it
considered 'relevant' in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one. But the Court did not
decide that each of these factors is entitled to equal weight. The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action. Indeed, the first
three factors discussed in Cort-the language and the focus of the
statute, its legislative history, and its purpose . . . -are
67 ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent.
The effect of making the implication test one of purely legislative
intent is to limit the potential for finding implied rights, because Congress rarely expresses any specific intent to imply a private right in the
absence of providing an express one. Finding legislative intent is then
left to statutory construction rather than the courts' common law powers. But the Touche Ross Court nonetheless noted that courts traditionally use the Cori factors-including consideration of express statutory
rights for special classes-to determine intent, and distinguished its
68
holding from those cases invoking the presumption of enforceability.
The Court in TransamericaMortgage Advisors followed its restrictive approach in Touche Ross and denied an implied right of action for damages in a 5-4 decision. It is one of only two Burger Court
decisions denying an implied right under a statute creating rights for a
special class. 69 All nine Justices agreed that, even under the restrictive approach, there should be an implied right of action for equitable relief.70 The division occurred only on the claim for damages. 7
In TransamericaMortgage Advisors, clients of investment advisors
67. Id. at 575-76. Moreover, Touche Ross signaled a more restrictive approach in its
discussion about Borak and Cort and in its construction of legislative intent: "To the extent
our analysis in today's decision differs from that of the Court in Borak, it suffices to say that
in a series of cases since Borak we have adhered to a stricter standard for the implication of
private causes of action, and we follow that stricter standard today ....
The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve
upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Id at 578.
68. Id. at 569.
69. The other, Universities Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981), is discussed infra text accompanying notes 112-15.
70. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 19; id. at 26-27
(White, J., dissenting).
71. Compare id at 19 with id at 26-27 (White, J., dissenting).
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sought an implied right of action under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940,72 alleging fraud and mismanagement against parties responsible
for management of a trust. Section 215 of the Act, under which plainmandated that contracts in violation of the Act
tiffs sought rescission,
"shall be void."'73 This language, by itself, was sufficient to justify an
implied right of action. "Wihen Congress declared in § 215 that certain contracts are void, it intended that the customary legal incidents of
voidness would follow, including the availability of a suit for rescission
or for an injunction against continued operation of the contract, and
' '74
for restitution.
While the majority easily found the requisite intent for the remedy
of rescission, it found no intent to provide a damage remedy. Section
206 of the Act, under which plaintiff sought damages, broadly proscribed fraudulent practices by investment advisors. 75 "Unlike § 215,
§ 206 simply proscribes certain conduct, and does not in its terms create
or alter civil liabilities. If monetary liability to a private plaintiff is to
be found, it must be read into the Act."' 76 The Court found no support
for monetary liability in the Act. To the contrary, it construed the establishment of judicial and administrative remedies as indicating an
77
intent not to allow alternative remedies.
The Court's finding of a contrary legislative intent was particularly
strained. It noted that other similar statutes contained express causes
of action for monetary damages. From this and some limited legislative history, the majority reasoned that Congress knew what it was doing in not providing an express cause of action, thereby intending to
78
exclude an implied right of action.
The Court's analysis limited, but did not reject, the presumption of
enforceability. After determining that section 206, like section 215, was
intended to benefit plaintiffs, the Court cautioned that "whether Congress intended additionally that these provisions would be enforced
through private litigation is a different question" 79 and that "the mere
fact that the statute was designed to protect advisors' clients does not
require the implication of a private cause of action for damages on
72.

15 U.S.C. § 80 (1976).

73. Id § 80b-15(b) (1976).
74. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 19.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
76. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 19.
77. Id. at 19-22.
78. Id For a discussion of the Court's negative reasoning, see infra text accompanying
notes 157-78.
79. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 18.
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their behalf' 80 These statements, however, only make clear that the
Court no longer focuses solely upon statutory rights for special classes
in determining implication, and that the presence of such a statutory
provision did not therefore require implication. Additional factors,
such as the three other Cort factors, are also pertinent. In other words,
statutes creating rights for special classes only create a presumption
that can be overcome by finding contrary intent. The Court in this
instance found a contrary intent in the legislative history and presence
of alternative judicial and administrative remedies.
The four dissenters in TransamericaMortgage Advisors-Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens--challenged the inconsistency
in finding an implied right for equitable, but not monetary, relief.8
Moreover, they advocated a "preferred approach" for determining implied rights by a more straightforward application of the Cort criteria
82
to determine legislative intent.
One year after his dissent in TransamericaMortgageAdvisors, Justice White used the "preferred approach" in the majority opinion in
California v. Sierra Club .8 The plaintiff environmental organization
sought an implied right of action to enjoin construction of water diversion facilities under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 prohibiting unauthorized obstruction of navigable
waters.8 4 The Court held there was no implied right, finding that the
statute only created a "general ban which carries with it no implication
of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons." 85 Thus,
the use of the "preferred approach" made no difference in the outcome
of this particular decision.
The Sierra Club case is significant, however, in that Justice Blackmun, one of the five majority Justices in TransamericaMortgageAdvisors, joined the four dissenters to form a new majority favoring a more
responsive construction of legislative intent. 86 Justice Rehnquist wrote
80.

Id. at 24.

81. Id. at 30-31 (White, J., dissenting).
82. "The preferred approach for determining whether a private right of action should
be implied from a federal statute was outlined in Cori v. Ash .

. .

. Four factors were

thought relevant; and although subsequent decisions have indicated that the implication of a
private right of action is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create
the private right of action, . . . these four factors are 'the criteria through which this intent
could be discerned.'" Id. at 26-27 (White, J., dissenting).
83. 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
84. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
85. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 294.
86. In Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I
(198 1), Justice Blackmun further shifted away from the four Justices he joined in Transamer-
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a concurring opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart
and Powell, for the sole purpose of disagreeing with the87 emphasis
placed upon the Cort criteria in the "preferred approach."
In recent years, the Court has most frequently framed the legislative intent test ina compromising manner that recognizes the Cort criteria but does not give them special emphasis. Justice Blackmun's
framing of the test in Universities Research Association v. Coutu'8 is
representative: "In order to determine whether Congress intended to
create the private right of action asserted here, we consider three factors set forth in Cort v. Ash . . that we have 'traditionally relied upon
in determining legislative intent': the 'language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose.' "89 By framing the test in
this manner, the Court leaves open the use of, and implicitly endorses,
the presumption of enforceability under statutes creating rights for special classes.
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran,90 the same
five-Justice majority 9 that used the "preferred approach" in Sierra
Club found an implied right of action for damages. The plaintiffs, investors in commodity futures contracts, sought implied rights of action
against a broker and a securities exchange for violation of antifraud
and unlawful price manipulation provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). 92 The price manipulation provisions did not confer
any rights upon a special class, and the majority conceded that "the
statutory language would be insufficient to imply a private cause of
action under these sections. ' 93 Instead, the Court framed the issue as
ica Mortgage Advisors. The majority in National Sea Clammers Ass'n refused to imply a
right of action because of a comprehensive enforcement mechanism under statutes that even
provided for citizen suits. Justice Blackmun joined Justice Stevens' separate opinion "to
emphasize that the Court's current approach to the judicial task of fashioning appropriate
remedies for violations of federal statutes is out of step with the Court's own history and
tradition." Id at 25-26. It was in this concurrence/dissent that these two Justices traced
through the federal court history supporting a presumption favoring implied rights of action.
Id at 22-27.
87. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 302.
88. 450 U.S. 754 (1981).
89. Id. at 770 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979)).
90. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
91. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
92. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
93. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. at 390-91 (1982). The
majority nonetheless emphasized, in support of the presumption of enforceability, that "the
Court consistently has found that Congress intended to create a cause of action 'where the
language of a statute explicitly confer[s] a right directly on a class of persons that include[s]
the plaintiff in the case."' Id at 391 n.91 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 444
U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979)).
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one of legislative intent to preserve a pre-existing implied right of action at the time that the CEA was amended in 1974:
When Congress enacts new legislation, the question is whether Congress intended to create a private remedy as a supplement to the express enforcement provisions of the statute. When Congress acts in a
statutory context in which an implied private remedy has already
been recognized by the courts, however, the inquiry logically is different. Congress need not have intended to create a new remedy,
intended
since one already existed; the question
94 is whether Congress
to preserve the pre-existing remedy.
The majority held that Congress, in its more recent amendments to
the Commodity Exchange Act, intended to preserve the implied right
of action that the federal courts had previously recognized prior to the
amendments. It reasoned that when Congress comprehensively revised
the CEA, it was aware of the implied rights of action recognized by the
courts under that Act and left intact those sections under which the
courts had previously implied the rights of action. 95 Moreover, the
the pre-existing implied
Court found an affirmative intent to preserve
96
history.
legislative
the
in
action
of
right
MerrillLynch adds possible new dimensions to the presumption of
enforceability. First, in cases involving statutes under which courts
have implied rights and which have been preserved or amended prior
to 1975 (when the Court adopted its stricter standard), the court should,
following Merrill Lynch, presume an intent to preserve a pre-existing
remedy.
Second, the same presumption should apply to cases involving
statutes under which courts have not specifically implied rights but
which are similar to statutes under which courts have implied rights.
In Cannon, for example, the Court found a legislative intent to imply a
private remedy under title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
because Congress had preserved the statute during a period when the
federal courts had found an implied right under a similar statutory provision in title VI.97 As Justice Rehnquist has recognized, prior to 1975
"Congress [had] good reason to think that the federal judiciary would
94.
95.
96.

Id at 378-79.
Id at 378-82.
The intent was founded on: 1)the addition of a savings clause to an exclusive

jurisdiction provision making clear that nothing in the Act limited jurisdiction conferred on
the courts; 2) strengthening the regulation of futures trading; and 3) finding that the new

administrative enforcement procedures were inadequate to protect aggrieved investors and
were therefore intended to supplement rather than supplant the implied judicial remedy. Id.
at 382-88.
97. See supra notes 54-56 & accompanying text.
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undertake" the task of determining whether there should be an implied
right of action. 98 Such pre-1975 determinations were based primarily
upon whether a statute created rights for a special class. Thus, when
Congress has, prior to 1975, preserved or amended a statute that creates
rights for a special class similar to other statutes from which courts
have implied rights of action, then the federal courts may find, or at
least presume, an intent to preserve a pre-existing remedy.
Third, the approaches used to imply rights under Cort and Merrill
Lynch may be combined. When a statute creates rights for a special
class, the plaintiff begins from the express language of the statute with a
presumption of enforceability, consistent with Cort and other Supreme
Court decisions discussed above. That presumption may be reinforced,
using an approach analogous to that of Merrill Lynch and Cannon,
by finding a legislative intent to create (or preserve) an implied right.
As noted in Cannon, "[tlhis Court has frequently accepted a history of
federal court recognition of a cause of action as indicative of the propriety of its implication." 99 Thus, for statutes that create rights for a
special class and that were preserved or amended prior to 1975, the
Court has a strong basis for finding a legislative intent to create or preserve an implied right of action.
The Burger Court, while restricting the implication doctrine, has
left the door open for determining implied rights of action on the basis
of the presumption of enforceability. A majority of the Court still appears to favor such a responsive construction of the legislative intent
test. Indeed, even after the restrictive decisions in Touche Ross and
TransamericaMortgage Advisors, the majority in MerrillLynch noted:
"The court consistently has found that Congress intended to create a
cause of action 'where the language of the statute explicitly confer[s] a
right directly on a class of persons that include[s] the plaintiff in this
case.' "0
Application of the Presumption
In SierraClub,' °0 the Court dealt with the problem of determining
whether a statute actually creates rights for a special class. The plaintiff-environmentalists argued that the Rivers and Harbors Appropria98. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
99. Id at 706 n.40.
100. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. at 391 n.91 (quoting
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 447 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979)).
101. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
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tions Act created rights for the class of persons who had been especially
injured by construction of water diversion facilities.' 0 2 The problem
with this approach is that it would enable anyone who is harmed by an
act within a statute's proscription-whether civil or criminal-to obtain
remedies under that statute. In denying implication, the Court stated:
"The question is not simply who would benefit from the Act, but
whether Congress intended to confer federal rights upon those
03
beneficiaries." 1
Entitlement programs for the poor such as Aid for Dependent
Children would clearly meet the special beneficiary test,' ° 4 but the
Supreme Court has not decided whether intended beneficiaries of a
statute who are not individually entitled to benefits meet the test. In
many instances, such beneficiaries have a statutory right to an opportunity for a benefit but are subject to administrative discretion to determine whether, in light of limited opportunities, they may actually
obtain the benefit. Examples include low-income tenants seeking public housing, 0 5 indigents seeking free health care from a federally assisted hospital, 0 6 and minorities seeking employment from a federal
contractor. 0 7 It would be improper to deny an implied right in such
situations merely because the beneficiary may not ultimately receive
the benefit. Sierra Club makes clear that an "effects test" is not appropriate. Instead, one must look to the intent of Congress. In each of
these cases, there is a statutory right for a special class, and the beneficiary is a member of that class. Moreover, the underlying purpose of
these types of legislative programs is to benefit a special class. The
legislative intent to provide a right to an opportunity for a special class
of persons should be enforceable in a manner similar to statutory rights
with an intent to provide an entitlement. 0 8
A related problem arises in grant-in-aid programs in which Congress mandates that certain benefits or protections be provided through
a third party. Congress may, for example, require that the administering federal agency require a state agency or private business receiving
102. Id at 294.
103. Id
104. See Rosado v. Wyman, 392 U.S. 397 (1970).
105. See. e.g., Silva v. East Providence Hous. Auth., 423 F. Supp. 453, 464-66 (D.R.I.
1976).
106. See, e.g., Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972).
107. See, e.g., Legal Aid Soc'y of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
108. In entitlement programs such as Aid for Families with Dependent Children, the
Supreme Court has granted implied rights of action. See Rosado v. Wyman, 392 U.S. 397
(1970).
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federal funds to provide the required benefit or protection. 1 9 While
third-party administration should make no difference in the ultimate
determination of legislative intent to benefit a special class, two
Supreme Court decisions indicate that the Court might treat threeparty regulatory programs differently.
In Cannon, the Court granted an implied right of action for sex
discrimination claims, largely because the language in title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 expressly identified the class Congress
intended to benefit. 110 However, the Court further stated:
There would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of
individual persons if Congress, instead of drafting Title IX with an
unmistakable focus on the benefited class, had written it simply as a
ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a
prohibition against the disbursement of public funds to educational
institutions engaged in discriminatory practices.'
In Universities Research Association v. Coutu, 1 2 the Court relied
upon this distinction to deny an implied right to employees seeking
back wages from a federal contractor who was allegedly required to
pay prevailing wages under the Davis-Bacon Act. The Act required
the Secretary of Labor to impose prevailing wage stipulations in certain
federal contracts. 1 3 However, the Secretary had predetermined that,
because of the type of work involved, the federal contractor was not
covered by the Act and was therefore not required to pay prevailing
wages. The Court denied the implied right for several appropriate reasons: 1) to do otherwise would have subjected the contractor to liability that the Secretary had predetermined should not exist; 2) Congress
had refused to pass amendments to the Act providing for an express
cause of action in such instances; and 3) the Act contained alternative
judicial and administrative remedies indicating an intent to exclude
other remedies." 4 Nonetheless, the Court, relying upon Cannon, also
reasoned that:
Section 1 of the Davis-Bacon Act requires that certain stipulations be
placed in federal construction contracts for the benefit of mechanics
and laborers, but it does not confer rights directly on those individuals. Since § I is simply "phrased as a directive to federal agencies
engaged in the disbursement of public funds,". . . its language pro109. Congress, for example, requires that federally assisted hospitals provide free health
care to indigents and that administrators of certain block grant funds require that recipient
state entities not discriminate in the administration of such funds. See id
110. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689-94 (1979).
111. Id. at 690-93.
112. 450 U.S. 754 (1981).
113. 40 U.S.C. § 276a(a) (1976).
114. Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. at 776-84.
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vides no support for the implication of a private remedy.II 5
The fact that Congress mandates a federal agency to require a certain protection for a special class as a condition to a federal grant definitely should not preclude finding an intent to imply a private remedy.
Congress' intent regarding enforceability may be the same in a direct
mandate that federal grantees not discriminate as in a mandate that the
federal agency impose a condition in the federal grant that the grantee
not discriminate. Resolution of the implication issue should depend on
a scrutiny of the underlying intent. If, for example, Congress specifically intended that the federal agency through its monitoring and grant
termination powers be the sole enforcer of the grant condition, then a
presumption of enforceability would not be proper. 1 6 However, if the
underlying purpose of the legislation is to protect beneficiaries and the
grant termination powers are either inadequate or only one means of
carrying out that purpose, then the grant condition should be
7
enforceable. "1
The Burger Court has demonstrated a hostility toward enforcement of legal rights by the intended beneficiaries of three-party regulatory or grant-in-aid programs in other contexts, such as standing to
sue." 8 While this hostility may be consistent with policies seeking to
halt the growth of federal grant legislation and government intervention, it is inconsistent with the federal courts' history of favoring enforcement by intended beneficiaries of statutory rights and with the
compelling policies favoring judicial protection of the rights of minorities and the poor who are dependent upon such programs. At the very
least, the Court should apply the legislative intent evenhandedly, with a
consideration of the underlying congressional purpose and intent
rather than simply looking to the form of a mandate and the structure
of a program to determine intent." 19
115.
116.

id at 772-73 (citation and footnote omitted).
See infra text accompanying notes 156-78.

117. Id
118. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975) ("When a governmental prohibition or restriction imposed on one party causes specific harm to a third party, harm that a
constitutional provision or statute was intended to prevent, the indirectness of the injury
does not necessarily deprive the person harmed of standing to vindicate his rights. . . . But

it may make it substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Art. III: to
establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants' actions, or
that prospective relief will remove the harm.") (citation omitted).
119. Note, supra note 42, at 894 ("the Court now invokes a literalist reading of statutory
terms as a surrogate for actual legislative intent").
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Rejection of the Strict ConstructionistApproach
The future of the implication doctrine hangs in a precarious balance. Four members of the Supreme Court-Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, all of whom dissented in
Merrill Lynch-appear to favor a strict construction of the legislative
intent test. Justice Powell explained the basic objective of this approach in his dissent in MerrillLynch: "[W]e should not condone the
implication of any private right of action from a federal statute absent
the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended such an
action to exist."' 120 This approach effectively would eliminate implied
rights of action since it is highly unlikely that Congress will express a
specific intent (let alone provide the most compelling evidence) to create an implied right of action when it has not provided an express
12 1

one.

In addition to using a restrictive formulation of the implication
doctrine, the strict constructionists draw negative inferences from the
absence of an express cause of action, presuming that Congress knew
what it was doing by the omission.1 22 This presumption is based upon
another ancient maxim, expressio unius, est exclusio alterius-the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other.12 3 The presence of
any other explicit remedies-judicial or administrative-even if not
comprehensive, are also interpreted as expressing an intent that such
remedies are exclusive.' 24 Thus, under the strict constructionist approach, combining a restrictive legislative intent test with a strict construction of intent, federal courts may imply rights of action only in the
rarest of circumstances.
While the strict constructionists have criticized prior Supreme
Court decisions for granting implied rights of action to effectuate legislative purposes, 125 their position is no less subject to the criticism that it
greatly contributes to nullifying regulatory programs. The Court's refusal to imply a right of action means that regulatees are effectively
120. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. at 408-09 (Powell, J.,
aissenting) (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 749 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
121. See supra note 6 & accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20 (1979).
123. Note, Implying CivilRemediesfrom FederalRegulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REv.
285, 290 (1963).
124. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20 (1979).
125. "Cort allows the Judicial Branch to approve policymaking authority vested by the
Constitution in the Legislative Branch." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
742 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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immunized from judicial review and that there is no judicial deterrent
to their noncompliance. Indeed, the deterrent works in the opposite
direction: the aggrieved beneficiaries are put on notice that courts will
not respond to their claims and are therefore deterred from seeking
judicial redress of their grievances. This immunity of regulatees and
deterrence of suits by aggrieved beneficiaries comes at a time when regulatory agencies are less likely to protect the rights of intended beneficiaries. 126 In this context, the judicial policy of self-restraint amounts
to a policy of nullification of regulatory programs.
Those favoring the strict-intent approach nonetheless insist that:
1) their position is constitutionally mandated; 2) the burdens and the
tasks imposed on the judiciary would be too great if implied rights of
action were more expansively recognized; and 3) the aggrieved beneficiaries should turn to Congress, not the courts, for the enactment of
specific causes of action. These arguments, discussed below, are not
compelling.
The ConstitutionalMandate
Justice Powell asserts that the strict constructionist position is the
"constitutionally appropriate standard."' 2 7 "Under Art. III, Congress
alone has the responsibility for determining the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts. As the legislative branch, Congress should determine when private parties are to be given causes of action under legis128
lation it adopts."'
A majority of the Court in Merrill Lynch rejected this separation
of powers argument, primarily on the ground that the federal courts
historically have implied rights of action under statutes creating rights
for a special class.' 2 9 Quoting Justice Frankfurter, the Court explained:
Courts . . . are organs with historic antecedents which bring with
them well-defined powers. They do not require explicit statutory authorization for familiar remedies to enforce statutory obligations
A duty declared by Congress does not evaporate for want of a
...
formulated sanction. When Congress has "left the matter at large for
judicial determination," our function is to decide what remedies are
appropriate in the light of the statutory language and purpose and of
the traditional modes by which courts compel performance of legal
obligations. . . . If civil liability is appropriate to effectuate the purposes of a statute, courts are not denied this traditional remedy be126.
127.
(Powell,
128.
129.

See supra note 8 & accompanying text.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 408-09 (1982).
J., dissenting).
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. at 376.
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cause it is not specifically authorized.' 30
While the majority in Merrill Lynch appeared to support a common law power to imply rights of action, this was unnecessary for purposes of rejecting Justice Powell's position. There is no language in
article III of the United States Constitution that mandates such a restrictive approach.1 3 ' While it is the province of Congress to establish
federal court jurisdiction, this does not mean that Congress has the burden of specifying a cause of action for every right that is intended to be
enforceable or that the courts do not have the power to infer authorizations for rights of action from certain statutes and their legislative history. The federal courts have consistently found that legislation
creating rights for a special class provides sufficient legislative authority
for implication.1 32 Obviously, a proper balance between Congress and
the courts must be maintained under the doctrine of separation of powers, but there is nothing in this doctrine or in the Constitution that
mandates the effective exclusion of the implied rights of action
doctrine.
The compelling reasons for restricting implied rights of action, as
indicated by the majority in MerrillLynch, are not constitutional but
pragmatic. 33 Restriction is due primarily to the complexity and extensive increase in federal grant legislation and federal court litigation,
and to the consequent concerns about increased burdens upon the judiciary and inappropriate lawmaking by the courts.
Some PragmaticObjections
The strict constructionists make some legitimate, practical objections to implication. However, these objections have been overemphasized and do not require a highly restrictive approach. One objection is
that implication may encourage aggrieved beneficiaries to circumvent
the administrative process for resolution of their grievances. 34 If the
administrative process is comprehensive, then implication should normally be excluded. But when the administrative process is inadequate,
130. Id (quoting Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S.
246, 261-62 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) (citations omitted).
131. Article III of the United States Constitution states, in relevant part, that "[t]he
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority.
... U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
132. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 391 n.91 (1982)
(quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 447 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979)).
133. Id at 376-78 (referring to such factors as the increased volume and complexity of
federal regulatory legislation). See also supra notes 38-40 & accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 450.
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the court should either review the case or refer it for administrative
consideration while retaining jurisdiction. Thus, the issue is really not
circumvention, but whether the administrative process is adequate to
resolve the grievance.
A second objection is that the courts will be overburdened with
new litigation if the implication doctrine is not restricted. 35 The implication doctrine has already been greatly restricted by the legislative intent test, thereby presumptively discouraging some litigation.
Moreover, the objection overlooks the fundamental point that courts
should not preclude review of an otherwise meritorious claim due to
36
some possible increase in the workload of the judiciary.1
A third objection is that courts, by implying rights of action, are
undertaking the improper role of lawmaking. 37 While courts should
not undertake unnecessary rulemaking, this does not mean that they
should abandon their historic role of implying rights of action. If
courts do not respond to the problems raised by implication, it is most
unrealistic to think that Congress will do so. Courts may respond better than Congress to particular injustices on a case-by-case or right-byright basis. Thus, the solution to the lawmaking objection lies, not in
eliminating the implication doctrine, but in developing appropriate
standards for determining when courts should afford judicial review.
Leaving It to Congress
The strict constructionists make three unrealistic assumptions
about Congress in support of their restrictive approach. The first is that
Congress, whenever it creates rights that should be enforceable in the
courts, should also enact a specific cause of action authorizing judicial
protection of those rights. The concept of statutory enactment of
causes of action as a totally self-sufficient and exclusive legislative pro135. "The escalating recourse to damage suits has placed a severe and growing burden
on the lower federal courts." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353, 408 n.17 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
136. The floodgates argument is not persuasive absent clear legislative concern
about the effect of a law on the judicial caseload. Courts should not deny relief to
a plaintiff advancing an otherwise meritorious claim because of financial or time
burdens. Rather, if massive caseloads prevent justice from being done, the legislature must be convinced to restructure jurisdiction or to increase the size and budget
of the judiciary. Denial of private rights of action to conserve judicial resources is
not only unprincipled but it may frustrate legislative policies to the same degree as
permitting private claims contrary to congressional purposes.
Comment, supra note 8, at 450-51.

137. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 408
(1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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cess for each enforceable statutory right is entirely unrealistic given the
sheer limits of legislative foresight, and the political realities and other
constraints (including the shortness of time) under which Congress operates. As Professor Mishkin explained:
[E]xclusive reliance upon statutory provision for the solution of all
problems is futile. . . .At the very least, effective Constitutionalism
requires recognition of power in the federal courts to declare, as a
matter of common law or 'judicial legislation,' rules which may be
necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the statutory
patterns enacted. . . by Congress. 138
Moreover, causes of action are more a judicial than a legislative concept. The federal courts, operating under appropriate guidelines and
restrictions, can respond more effectively to the lack of a cause of action when the circumstances of a particular case and the relevant statutory provisions merit relief.
The second assumption made by the strict constructionists is that
Congress intended to exclude a private right of action simply because it
did not provide one. This, too, is unrealistic. Congress may not include a particular cause of action for many reasons unrelated to an
intent to exclude implication. Such reasons include nonconsideration
of the issue or a belief that it is unnecessary to specifically imply a right.
For these reasons the Supreme Court rejected this second strict constructionist assumption in Cort in the absence of any indication of leg139
islative intent to exclude other remedies.
The strict constructionists' third assumption, that aggrieved beneficiaries should look to Congress rather than the courts for the protection
of their rights, is particularly unrealistic for minorities and the poor.
Responding to the plaintiffs' assertion in Touche Ross that the Court's
refusal to imply a right of action "sanctions injustice," Justice Rehnquist turned a deaf ear: "[E]ven if that were the case, the argument is
made in the wrong forum, for we are not at liberty to legislate. If there
is to be a federal damages remedy under these circumstances, Congress
must provide it."'14 While this assumption may be valid when applied
to organized business interests, it is not when the beneficiaries are unorganized and possess little political influence. Minority groups and the
poor historically have looked to the courts for the protection of their
rights. 14 1 The closing of the courthouse doors by effectively eliminating
138. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law" Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of Nationaland State Rules/or Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 800 (1957).
139. Cort v. Ash, 442 U.S. 66, 82 n.14 (1975).
140. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979).
141. See infra notes 142-53 & accompanying text,
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implied rights of action for these classes of persons would, as discussed
below, abrogate a very important and historic function of the courts.
Presumption of Enforceability for the Poor and Minorities
While not openly declaring such a policy, the Supreme Court has
been relatively generous in implying rights of action for minorities and
the poor. The first cases to imply private causes of action to protect
civil rights began with the Court's 1944 decisions in Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville Railroad142 and Tunstall v. Brotherhoodof Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen.143 Those decisions held that black employees had
implied rights of action to sue under the Railway Labor Act to remedy
harms caused by discriminatory agreements entered into by management and the union.44 More recently, the Court implied rights of action in three other civil rights cases, each of which involved an
administrative enforcement mechanism that the Court determined was
insufficient to protect the civil rights at issue. In Allen v. State Board of
Elections,145 the Court held that individual voters had an implied right
to challenge local voting enactments under section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. In Lau v. Nichols, 146 the Court permitted an implied right of action under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
force a school district receiving federal funds to comply with regulations prohibiting recipients from discriminating on the basis of race.
Finally, in Cannon v. University of Chicago,'147 the Court implied a right
of action for the plaintiff under title IX of the Civil Rights Act prohibiting sex discrimination.
The Supreme Court has decided only one implied right of action
case limited to a poverty law issue. In Rosado v. Wyman,48 the Court
granted an implied right of action to welfare recipients to challenge
state welfare enactments. The Court has also decided only one disability case. In Pennhurst State School v. Halderman,' 14 9 a case involving
142. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
143. 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
144. See supra notes 25-28 & accompanying text.
145. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
146. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). Although the Court did not expressly discuss the implied right
of action issue, it relied upon title VI in holding for plaintiffs on the merits and subsequently
stated that Lau was "consistent, at least, with the widely accepted assumption that Title VI
creates a private cause of action." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 702 n.33
(1979).
147. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
148. 392 U.S. 397 (1970). The Court subsequently stated that the basis for granting the
right of action in Rosado was 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 2 (1979).
149. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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the enforceability of rights for the disabled, the majority remanded the
implied right of action issue to the circuit court of appeals.
Thus, in the seven Supreme Court cases involving implied rights
of action issues affecting minorities or the poor, the Court has granted
implied rights in six and remanded the other. The fact that the
Supreme Court has not denied an implied right of action in a case involving a minority group or the poor indicates that there are underly50
ing policy reasons favoring implication for these groups.'
Statutes creating rights for minorities or the poor are often enacted
to protect fundamental, sometimes constitutional, rights. 15' Courts
have traditionally played a paramount role in preserving these rights.
"It is hard to conceive a task more appropriate for federal courts than
to protect civil rights .... ,,152
Courts have also been sensitive to providing protection to these
groups because they don't have other realistic recourse for the protection of their rights. They lack representation in, or the power to effectively influence or control, major decision-making in Congress and in
53
most administrative agencies.1
Moreover, when Congress enacts regulatory programs to protect
minorities or the poor, administrative enforcement processes are usually intended to supplement, rather than supplant, the judicial enforcement that has long pervaded this area. 154 Each of the implied rights of
action cases that involved administrative enforcement mechanisms to
protect minorities or the poor found that the implication was needed to
effectuate the underlying purpose of the statute. 55 Regulatory programs for minorities and the poor normally have a comprehensive purpose of eliminating or correcting some serious abuse such as
discrimination. Inherent in such a comprehensive purpose is the prin150. For an analysis of policy reasons favoring implication in civil rights cases and especially cases under title IX, see Note, Implied Rights ofAction to Enforce Civil Rights.- The
Casefor a Sympathetic View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378, 1396-1400 (1978).
151. See, e.g., supra note 7.
152. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 90 (1973).
153. See Bonfield, Representationforthe Poor in FederalRulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REV.
511 (1969).
154. To the extent that implication involves a search for congressional intent, it seems
unlikely that a Congress involved in enacting legislation for the preservation of civil rights
would seek to strip the courts of the paramount role they have traditionally played in preserving those rights. More likely, the administrative enforcement processes are intended to
supplement the judicial enforcement that has long characterized the civil rights area. Note,
supra note 151, at 1400.
155. See supra notes 145-47 & accompanying text.
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ciple that a panoply of remedies-administrative and legislativeshould be used to carry out the legislative intent to eradicate the abuse.
For these reasons it is important that the federal courts construe
the legislative intent test in a manner that is responsive to the need for
judicial protection of minorities and the poor. This can be done by
giving due weight to the presumption of enforceability under statutes
creating rights for protected groups.
The Presumption of Exclusivity
The presumption of exclusivity is derived from the ancient maxim
of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The result of applying this maxim is the opposite from the result of applying the maxim
ubijus ibi remedium that underlies the presumption of enforceability.
Application of the former maxim leads to a construction that the congressional expression of a cause of action or alternative remedy is the
exclusion of any other; 15 6 application of the latter maxim leads to a
construction that the creation of a right implies the creation of a remedy. 15 7 Fortunately, the courts do not rely upon either inflexible
maxim. The proposed presumptions, although derived from these
maxims, have substantially qualified them, enabling a more flexible
and functional approach.
The presumption of exclusivity may apply from the simple fact
that the legislature did not make express the cause of action that a
plaintiff wants the court to imply. However, the legislative provision of
a statutory right for a special class has traditionally served to overcome
such a legislative omission. As the Court explained in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers,1 58 "[t]his omission, although significant, . . . is not dispositive if, among other things, the language of the
statutes indicates that they were enacted for the special benefit of a
class of which petitioner is a member."' 5 9
The presumption of exclusivity applies with greater force when the
legislature also provides alternative judicial and administrative remedies. "The presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a
statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforce156. See supra note 123-24 & accompanying text.
157. See supra note 17 & accompanying text.
158. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
159. Id. at 91-92 (footnote omitted). See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 689 (1979).

May/July 1983]

IMPLYING RIGHTS OF ACTION

ment." 60 Thus, when courts determine that the alternative remedies
are comprehensive, they generally conclude that the legislature intended such remedies to be exclusive and deny implied rights of action
even when a plaintiff is relying on a statute that creates rights for a
16
special class. 1
Four cases illustrate the presumption of exclusivity. In Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board,162 a plaintiff employee
sought an implied right of action under the Railway Labor Act 163 for
cancellation of the Mediation Board's resolution of an election dispute.
The Court refused to imply a right of action, emphasizing that the Act
established a comprehensive administrative mechanism under the Mediation Board to resolve labor election disputes and a special 64procedure
for resolving the sensitive type of election issue in dispute.'
In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of
Railway Passengers (4mtrak),16 5 an organization of passengers sought
an implied right of action under the Rail Passenger Service Act of
1970166 to enjoin the discontinuance of certain routes operated by defendant Amtrak. Applying the maxim exclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the Court presumed a legislative intent against implication since
the Act expressly provided a public cause of action enforceable only by
the Attorney General. "[Tlhe maxim would clearly compel the conclusion that the remedies in [the Act] are the exclusive means to enforce
the duties and obligations imposed by the Act."' 67 The Court's conclusion was buttressed by a finding that implication would also be contrary to the legislative history and purpose. The legislators specifically
rejected an amendment to add an express cause of action that the plaintiff sought through implication. 68 Moreover, since a purpose of the
Act was to reduce railway routes, the Court found that implication to
enjoin discontinuance of the route would be contrary to the Act's
69
purpose.'
160. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. at 97.
161. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Switchmen's
Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
162. 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
163. Pub. L. No. 257, § 2, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
164. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. at 304-06.
165. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
166. 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-645 (1976).
167. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of Ry. Passengers, 414 U.S. at
458.
168. Id at 460-61.
169. Id. at 461.
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In TransamericaMortgageAdvisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 170 the Court, although granting an implied right for contract rescission, refused to imply a private right for damages under the Investment Advisors Act.
Citing Amtrak, the Court stated "that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy. . . a court must be chary of reading others
into it." 171 The Court reasoned that because portions of other securities
acts contained express causes of action for damages, Congress must
have intended to preclude implication under the Investment Advisors
Act by not providing such an express cause of action. 172 The reasoning
that a congressional provision of an express cause of action in other
statutes means an intent not to imply one under the statute at issue is
obviously attenuated. Such reasoning, if taken to its logical conclusion,
would sound the death knell of implied rights.
In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. NationalSea Clammers
Association 17 3 the Court's application of the expressio unius maxim
was more rational than its overly broad application in Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors. The plaintiff, a fishing organization, sought an implied right to enjoin government officials from polluting the Atlantic in
violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 174 The Act provides both civil and criminal penalties and contains "unusually elaborate" enforcement procedures permitting both public and private
suits. 75 Enforcement by citizen suits must follow specified procedures
that plaintiffs ignored, including sixty days prior notice to potential defendants. 76 The Court therefore concluded that Congress would not
have intended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies
for private citizens when it had expressly established enforcement pro177
visions in the Act.
Justices Stevens and Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, acknowledged the presumption of exclusivity given the comprehensive remedial scheme, but stated that this presumption may be
rebutted by express statutory language or clear references in the legislative history:
[A] comprehensive remedial scheme can evidence a congressional
decision to preclude other remedies. . . . However, we must not lose
170. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
171. Id. at 19.
172. Id. at 19-21.
173. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
174. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
175. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 13.
176. Id at 14.
177. Id. at 14-15.

May/July 19831

IMPLYING RIGHTS OF ACTION

sight of the fact that our evaluation of a statute's express remedies is
merely a tool used to discern congressional intent; it is not an end in
itself. No matter how comprehensive we may consider a statute's
remedial scheme to be, Congress is at liberty to leave other remedial
avenues open. Express statutory language or clear references in the
of exclusivity
legislative history will rebut whatever presumption
1 78
arises from comprehensive remedial provisions.

This position is certainly consistent with a legislative intent test. In
sum, the presumption of exclusivity applies most appropriately to statutes with comprehensive remedial schemes, and even then, only as a
presumption subject to rebuttal by other express statutory provisions or
179
contrary legislative history.
178. Id at 28 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The dissenters found such express statutory language in a "saving clause," stating that
nothing in the Act shall restrict the right to relief available under any other law. Id at 29.
The majority rejected this argument, stating that it did not apply to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under
which plaintiffs sought to bring suit. Id at 15-17.
179. To overcome the presumption that plaintiffs can enforce a federal statute creating
federal rights in a § 1983 suit, discussed supra note 1. Defendants must show that Congress
intended the federal statute to provide an exclusive remedy, or that allowance of a § 1983
action would otherwise contradict an express legislative intent. Maine v. Thiboutot, 488
U.S. 1, 22 n.11 (Powell, J., dissenting) (cited with approval in Pennhurst State School v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981)). See also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441
U.S. 600, 672 (1979) (White, J., concurring). Justice Stevens has explained the applicable
test:
Because the § 1983 plaintiff is invoking an express private remedy that is, on its
face, applicable any time a violation of a federal right is alleged. . . , the burden is
properly placed on the defendant to show that Congress, in enacting the particular
substantive statute at issue, intended an exception to the general rule of § 1983. A
defendant may carry this burden by identifying express statutory language or legislative history revealing Congress' intent to foreclose the § 1983 remedy, or by establishing that Congress intended the remedies provided in the substantive statute
itself be exclusive.
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 27 n. I1
(Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Supreme Court found that the defendant met this burden in NationalSea Clammers Ass'n
by establishing a presumption of exclusivity. See also Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,28 (1980); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,22 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 672 (1979) (White, J., concurring).
The case for exclusivity was particularly strong since the underlying statute established "unusually elaborate" enforcement procedures permitting both public and private suits. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 13. The Court
was especially concerned that the plaintiff, who had failed to comply with specific notice
requirements prescribed by statute, not be allowed to circumvent a comprehensive alternative scheme by suing under § 1983. Id at 14.
To be consistent, the strict constructionists would have to place a particularly heavy
burden upon a defendant in § 1983 actions. The strict constructionist standard for determining legislative intent to imply a right of action is that there must be the most compelling
evidence that Congress in fact intended such an action to exist. See supra note 5 & accom-
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Qualifying the Presumption of Exclusivity

The mere establishment of an administrative mechanism is not, by
itself, sufficient reason to presume a legislative intent to exclude implied rights. Justice White explained:
As a general matter, it is clear that the fact that a federal administrative agency has the power to oversee a cooperative state-federal venture does not mean that Congress intended such oversight to be the
exclusive remedy for enforcing statutory rights. This court is 'most
reluctant to assume Congress has closed the avenue of effective judicial review to those individuals most directly affected by the administration of its programs' even if the agency180has the statutory power to
cut off federal funds for noncompliance.

Thus, if the administrative remedy is not comprehensive or is inadequate for resolving the individual grievance, the presumption of exclusivity should, depending upon the nature of the inadequacy, either not
apply at all or apply with less weight.
It would be naive for courts to conclude that Congress intended to
exclude private remedies by the provision of a noncomprehensive administrative scheme which is inadequate for resolving particular grievances. In order to assess fully the legislative intent to exclude implied
rights of action, courts must look not only at the wording of the statute,
but also at the adequacy of the administrative mechanism to resolve the
grievance. The Supreme Court has done this on several occasions,
finding an administrative mechanism inadequate and an implied right
of action therefore necessary to effectuate congressional purposes.' 8 1
There are several reasons why an administrative remedy, in the
context of regulatory programs for minorities or the poor, may be inadpanying text. Consistency should require at least the same strict standard to determine legislative intent for purposes of excluding a § 1983 action. Their deference to Congress should
be no less when Congress, under § 1983, has created an express cause of action.
This Article does not propose a strict constructionist approach for implication or exclusion. But, in any event, the courts must not require a more strict standard to determine
legislative intent to imply as opposed to legislative intent to exclude a private right of action.
To do so would be wholly inconsistent, indicating a result-oriented approach to benefit regulatees at the expense of the intended beneficiaries. The better approach would be to reject
the strict constructionist standard for implication and apply the presumptions and standards
discussed above.
180. Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,52 (1981) (White. J., dissenting)
(quoting Rosado v. Wyman, 392 U.S. 397, 420 (1970)). Similarly, Justice Blackmun, concurring in Pennhurst, stated that: "private parties, the intended beneficiaries of the act, should
have the power to enforce the modest legal contents of § 6063 would not be an unusual
application of our precedents, even for a legislative scheme that involves federal regulatory
supervision of state operations." d at 33. See also Cannon v. University of Chicago. 441
U.S. 677, 704-05 (1979).
181. See infra text accompanying notes 184-88.
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equate and therefore may not justify application of the presumption of
exclusivity. First, many federal regulatory programs establish agency
oversight procedures for purposes of monitoring the performance of
regulatees, rather than resolving individual grievances. 82 These reviews are not initiated by the complainant, nor does the complainant
have any necessary role in them. They are undertaken by the agency
according to a prescribed agency format for purposes that may have
to do with the grievance of the particular
little or nothing
83
beneficiary.
The Supreme Court has not allowed this type of administrative
mechanism to exclude implied rights of action. As the Court in Cannon explained,
this court has sometimes refused to imply private rights of action
where administrative or like remedies are available .... But it has
never withheld a private remedy when the statute explicitly confers a
benefit on a class of persons and where it does not assure those perin the administrative prosons the ability to activate and participate
184
cess contemplated by the statute.
A second and related inadequacy is that the type of remedy afforded by the administrative mechanism may not be responsive, and
may even be counterproductive, to resolving the grievance raised by
the complainant. Termination of federal funding is frequently an example of this type of remedy. The Court has been most reluctant to
assume that Congress has closed the avenue of effective judicial review
even if the agency has the statutory power to cut off federal funds for
noncompliance. "In part, this reluctance is founded on the perception
that a funds cut off is a drastic remedy with injurious consequences to
the supposed beneficiaries of the Act."'185
In addition to the fact that the termination of funding may harm
182. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance, for example, regularly undertakes
compliance reviews of a certain percentage of federal contractors each year to ensure nondiscrimination in employment. See Legal Aid Soc'y of Alameda County v. Brennan, 381 F.
Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1974), afd, 608 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921
(1980). Similarly, the Office of Civil Rights periodically reviews educational institutions to
assure nondiscrimination. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
183. See supra note 182 & infra note 184.
184. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 707 n.41 (1979). The Court further
noted that "the complaint procedure adopted by HEW does not allow the complainant to
participate in the investigation or subsequent enforcement proceedings. Moreover, even if
those proceedings result in a finding of a violation, a resulting voluntary compliance agreement need not include relief for the complainant." Id
185. Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,52 (1981) (White, J., dissenting)
(quoting Rosado v. Wyman, 392 U.S. 397,420 (1970)). See K. CAPALLI, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER FEDERAL GRANTS 95-103, 339-44 (1979).
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the aggrieved beneficiary, as well as many others, the termination of
federal funding may also require proof that the regulatee's practices are
pervasively illegal. As the Court noted in Cannon, "in that kind of
situation, it makes little sense to impose on an individual, whose only
interest is in obtaining a benefit for herself, or on HEW, the burden of
demonstrating that an institution's practices are so pervasively discrim186
inatory that a complete cutoff of federal funding is appropriate."'
Third, even if the administrative mechanism may appear adequate
on paper, the agency may not, for several reasons, implement the
mechanism adequately. If, for example, an aggrieved beneficiary files a
complaint, then "the agency may simply decide not to investigate-a
decision that often will be based on a lack of enforcement resources,
rather than on any conclusion on the merits of the complaint."'18 7 The
lack of adequate enforcement resources was also one of the reasons that
led the court in Borak to imply a private right of action.' 8
Another common reason for this type of administrative inadequacy is systematic delay in investigations and administrative hearings.
When individual complainants are not assured that the administrative
process will reach a decision on their complaints within a reasonable
time, it makes little sense to find an adequate remedy and a consequent
presumption of exclusivity.' 89
The presumption of exclusivity is weakened by a congressional
awareness of the failure or inability of the administrative agency to
provide relief to aggrieved persons. This congressional awareness
might be demonstrated by a legislative decision to reduce drastically
agency funding, conduct legislative oversight hearings on systematic
agency nonenforcement of laws, or conduct legislative reviews of ad186. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 705 (1979).
187. Id. at 707 n.41.
188. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
189. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 707 n.41. When an agency decides not to investigate, delays in the investigations, or has a track record of inadequate
enforcement on behalf of the intended beneficiaries, it might be argued that the proper recourse of the complainant is to bring a suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-581 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), to compel the agency to comply with its enforcement obligations. For an example of such a suit, see Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d
1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
This argument was rejected in Cannon: "[Slurely this alternative is far more disruptive
of HEW's efforts efficiently to allocate its enforcement resources under Title IX than a private suit against the recipient of federal aid could ever be." 441 U.S. at 707 n.4 1. Moreover,
such litigation has serious obstacles in terms of standing to bring suit and the scope of review. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). Thus, a suit
under the APA is not a viable alternative to an implied right of action and should not serve
as an excuse for a refusal to imply a right of action.
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ministrative regulations making the administrative mechanism inadequate. In such cases, it would be more difficult to establish that
Congress, by the mere adoption of an administrative mechanism, really
intended to preclude judicial recourse to individuals unable to obtain
adequate administrative relief.
In sum, the presumption of exclusivity should not apply or should
apply with little weight when an administrative remedy is inadequate.
The more clearly one can establish the nonavailability or inadequacy
of the administrative remedy, the greater the case for nonapplication of
this presumption. The inadequacy of the administrative remedy, as
discussed in the next section, may also provide support for a finding
that the legislative purpose may be furthered by implying a private
right of action.
A Final Step: Consideration of Statutory Purposes
The first three Cort factors relating to the wording and focus of the
statute, its legislative history, and its purpose are those "traditionally
relied upon" to determine legislative intent. ,90 The courts look initially
at the first two factors-the statute and its history. If the intent is clear
from these factors, then the inquiry should not proceed any further. 19 1
Thus, under the standards proposed in this Article, courts should imply
a right of action if the statute creates rights for a special class and the
legislative history supports the presumption of enforceability. Conversely, if the statute creates a comprehensive administrative remedy
and the legislative history supports the presumption of exclusivity, then
the courts should deny an implied right. But, if consideration of the
first two factors does not make clear the legislature's intent, then an
inquiry into the third Cort factor, the statutory purpose, is not only
appropriate, but may be determinative.
The Court in Cannon explained the appropriate inquiry into statutory purposes: "[A] private remedy should not be implied if it would
frustrate the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme. On the
other hand, when that remedy is necessary or at least helpful to the
accomplishment of the statutory purpose, the Court is decidedly recep92
tive to its implication under the statute."'
In considering whether implication would further or frustrate statutory purposes, there are at least three relevant factors: 1) the need for
implication, 2) its effect, and 3) the appropriate role of the court in
190. See supra notes 67-68 & accompanying text.
191. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981).
192. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 703.
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relation to that of the agency in furthering the statutory purpose. Each
of these factors is discussed below.
The Needfor Implication
Necessity is frequently a touchstone for implication. The Court in
Borak stated that "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.'' 93 Not coincidentally, the Court in Cannon stated that implication "is not only sensible but is fully consistent with-and in some
1 94
cases even necessary to-the orderly enforcement of the statute."'
Under the legislative intent test, courts can more easily rationalize a
legislative intent for implication when it is necessary, rather than
merely helpful, to effectuate a statutory purpose,
In cases involving minorities and the poor, implication is often
necessary for several reasons. First, the administrative mechanisms established by Congress to protect the statutory rights or benefits of minorities and the poor are frequently inadequate. 95 In such cases,
implication may be necessary to the administrative mechanism as a
means of effecting a legislative intent to correct abusive practices
against minorities and the poor.
Second, the types of harm suffered by minorities and the poor,
when not afforded statutory protections or benefits, are frequently irreparable. 9 6 Implication to prevent an irreparable, rather than a
merely economic, harm may be justifiably compelling to courts seeking
to act consistently with legislative intent to protect special classes of
persons.
Third, minorities and the poor frequently have no other viable recourse for the protection of their rights than through the courts, thereby
97
increasing the need for implication. 1
193.
194.
195.

J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (emphasis supplied).
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 705-06 (emphasis supplied).
See supra notes 182-89 & accompanying text.

196.

Examples include discrimination against minorities in employment, housing, or ed-

ucation. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Silva v. East Providence Hous. Auth., 423 F. Supp.

453 (D.R.I. 1976). Another example includes the failure to provide emergency or other
health care to indigents. See, e.g., Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972); Rose,
FederalRegulation of Services to the Poor Under the Hill-Burton Act. Realities and Pitfalls,
70 Nw. U.L. REV. 168 (1975), and cases cited therein.
197. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), which first
raised the question "whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
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The Effect of Implication
In assessing whether implication may further or frustrate a statutory purpose, courts should consider not only the need, but also the
effect of implication. When judicial intervention is in the nature of
prospective relief, such as an injunction against an abusive practice that
violates a regulatory requirement, then it almost always furthers regulatory purposes. One exception is when there is an adequate, alternative judicial remedy or comprehensive administrative mechanism. In
such an instance, implication may allow improper circumvention of the
alternative remedy.1 98 This exception, of course, does not apply when
the judicial or administrative remedy is inadequate for protection of
the complainant's fights. Courts have frequently found that implication furthers a statutory purpose when administrative remedies are
inadequate. 199
Some commentators claim that implied fights of action for monetary damages may, unlike prospective relief, frustrate regulatory purposes.20 0 Complainants seeking monetary relief, they assert, may be
guided more by economic gain than regulatory purposes.20 ' They also
state that imposition of damages may create unwarranted burdens on
regulatees and discourage them from participating in the regulatory
202
programs.
The Burger Court has shown some reluctance to imply a fight of
action for damages. In TransamericaMortgageAdvisors, for example,
the Court went out of its way to find no legislative intent to create an
implied fight of action for damages after finding an implied fight for
contract rescission. 20 3 However, there is no clear pattern against implying fights of action for damages, especially in light of the Court's recent
narily to be relied upon to protect minorities and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry." Id at 152 n.4.
198. E.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1,14 (1981).
199. E.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706-07 (1979); Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969); J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964). See
supra notes 180-84 & accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 4, where the author contends that implied private
rights of action "are ill-suited to the deterrence system of the securities laws and may hamper the central purpose of those statutes .... [P]rivate plaintiffs engage in litigation to further their own economic interests; they rarely concern themselves with the social costs and
social benefits of their lawsuits .... [P]rivate lawsuits may result in awards that ... are so
large as to deter desirable conduct or so small as to leave significant violations undeterred."
Id at 570-72.
201. Id at 571.
202. Id at 572-78.
203. See supra notes 72-78 & accompanying text.
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decision in MerrillLynch finding an implied right for damages. 2°4
Monetary awards against regulatees may be important to the effective functioning of regulatory programs, particularly those affecting minorities or the poor. The lack of monetary awards can be a major
reason why regulatory programs fail. If regulatees know that the worst
penalty for violation of regulatory requirements is that they will only
be told to do prospectively that which they should have done in the first
20 5
place, then they have no real incentive to comply with the law.
There may be instances when granting monetary rather than injunctive relief may actually frustrate regulatory objectives. In such instances, the court should openly state that consideration as a factor in
its ultimate determination of legislative intent. This approach is preferable to the convoluted reasoning in TransamericaMortgage Advisors,
in which the Court sought to find a specific legislative intent in the
20 6
statutory wording and history favoring equitable but not legal relief.
Referral to Agency
Courts may hesitate to imply rights of action due to uncertainties
about whether judicial resolution would further or frustrate statutory
purposes when administrative resolution may be an option. These uncertainties include whether: 1) an administrative mechanism is in fact
inadequate to protect the plaintiff's rights; 2) the case might require
extensive judicial resources to resolve; 3) the agency might have greater
expertise than the court; 4) plaintiffs might be encouraged to circumvent possible administrative remedies if a private right is implied; or
5) an agency might be prodded into resolving an issue that it might
otherwise not address or address inadequately. During a period em204. See supra notes 90-92 & accompanying text.
205. The importance of this principle was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 442 U.S. 405 (1975):
It is the reasonably certain prospect of a back pay award that "provide[s] the spur
or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate
their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate so far as possible the last
vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history."
Id at 417-18 (quoting United States v. N. L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
This principle is particularly important in the types of regulatory programs in which the
regulatees have substantial profit incentives to take advantage of minorities and the poor.
Monetary awards in the event of noncompliance can counter those negative profit
incentives.
206. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 25-26 (1979) (White,
J., dissenting) ("By resurrecting distinctions between legal and equitable relief, the Court
reaches a result that, as aU parties to this litigation agree, can only be considered
anomalous.").
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phasizing judicial restraint, these types of uncertainties are likely to encourage courts to deny implied rights in close cases.
Courts should not refuse to imply rights of actions because of such
uncertainties. The decision between judicial and administrative resolution need not be viewed in all-or-nothing terms. There is an option.
Rather than denying implied rights of action in such cases, courts
should imply a right of action and then refer the matter to the administrative agency for initial resolution under a theory similar to that of
primary jurisdiction. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a
court may initially refer a matter to an agency for resolution, but retain
ultimate jurisdiction of the case.20 7 Thus, if the agency fails to handle
the grievance appropriately or the administrative remedy proves inadequate, the court may then assume jurisdiction. The court might also
refer certain issues to the agency for resolution but retain others regarding which the court believes it has greater expertise. This option enables courts to treat implied right of action issues in a less summary
and more flexible manner. Such a procedure would enable courts to
act more consistently with regulatory purposes.
In sum, courts should go through a three-step process in resolving
implied right of action issues under the legislative intent test. The first
two steps involve an examination of the statutory wording and legislative history to determine whether there is a basis for 1) a presumption
of enforceability and 2) a presumption of exclusivity. If there is a basis
for both, or the basis for one is not compelling, the court should examine the statutory purposes to resolve the issue, considering the types
of factors and options explained above.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has formulated a restrictive legislative intent
test which, if construed strictly, could effectively eliminate implied
rights of action in many cases where aggrieved persons merit judicial
protection of their legal rights. A systematic closing of courthouse
doors to aggrieved beneficiaries would also immunize noncomplying
regulatees from judicial review. Minorities and the poor would be
most adversely affected, for they, more than any other group, are dependent upon federal legislation for the protection of fundamental
207.

See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 19.01-.09 (Supp. 1970).

At one time, primary jurisdiction led courts to deny implied rights, but this is no longer the
preferred procedure. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate
SurrogateforClaimfor Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 455 n.123 (1974); O'Neil, PublicRegulation
andPrivate Rights ofAction, 52 CAL. L, REV. 231, 274-79 (1964).
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rights and have no other effective forum for remedying the abuse of
their rights.
Rather than strictly construing the legislative intent test, federal
courts should- consistent with their history--construe statutes creating rights for special classes as creating a presumption of enforceability.
This presumption should carry particular weight when statutes create
important rights for the poor and minorities.
The presumption of enforceability may be overcome by a presumption of exclusivity when the statute establishes a comprehensive
remedial scheme. But if this remedial scheme is inadequate, then the
presumption of exclusivity should not prevail.
When there is uncertainty or a conflict between the two presumptions, the court should consider the statutory purposes to guide its resolution. In difficult cases, the court has the option of requiring
administrative resolution while retaining jurisdiction, enabling judicial
review in the event that the administrative remedy turns out to be
inadequate.

